obstacle for those seeking reform. In combination, these challenges pose a daunting series of hurdles and pitfalls.
I. THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET FAILURE
The Manifesto builds its analysis upon the traditional public goods framework of neoclassical economics. 4 Public goods have two distinguishing features: (1) nonexcludability-it is difficult to exclude those who do not pay for the good from consuming it; and (2) nonrivalrous competition-additional consumers of the good do not deplete the quantity of the good available to others. Lighthouses, television signals, and national defense are traditional examples of public goods. Intellectual works, such as computer programs, also exhibit these attributes. 5 The market will tend to undersupply these goods because producers cannot reap the marginal (incremental) value of their investment in providing such goods. The traditional solution to the public goods problem in information markets is the creation of intellectual property rights by the government. These rights enable the creator to appropriate adequate reward and spur the discovery of new and better products. 6 Applying this framework, the Manifesto promotes the principle that all intellectual work bearing significant know-how on its face should be protected under intellectual property law. Otherwise, innovation will be unduly discouraged by competition in the marketplace.
This mode of analysis, however, is built upon a highly simplified view of the innovative process and excludes a number of other important policy concerns. Professor William Nordhaus's classic model of the innovative process assumes that investments in research produce a single independent innovation. 7 Without intellectual property protection, competitors could easily appropriate the value of the innovation before the original innovator could recover his or her investments in research and development. Nordhaus's economic framework also recognizes that creating property rights in innovations leads to deadweight loss as a result of monopoly pricing. The principal policy implication of this model is that the term of intellectual property protection should be calibrated to balance the incentive benefits of protection against the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing. 4. See Paul A. Samuelson & William D. Nordhaus, Economics 48-49, 713-15 (12th ed. 1985) ; Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2365-69, 2371-78. 5. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609, 614-16 (Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research ed., 1962) . As the Manifesto emphasizes, computer programs often bear much of their know-how on their face. See, e.g., Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2333 (arguing that software programs are vulnerable to "trivial acquisition of behavioral equivalence").
6. See William D. Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change 86-90 (1969) . 7. Id. at 3-7.
Since Nordhaus's important early work, economic historians and economic theorists have greatly enriched our understanding of the innovative process and the implications for public policy. Historical and industry studies of the innovation process find that inventions are highly interdependent: "Technologies... undergo.., a gradual, evolutionary development which is intimately bound up with the course of their diffusion." s In fact, "secondary inventions"-including essential design improvements, refinements, and adaptations to a variety of uses-are often as crucial to the generation of social benefits as the initial discovery. 9 Economic theorists have more recently developed models of the innovative process incorporating concepts of rivalrous and cumulative innovation. 10 These models have uncovered a range of important effects beyond the reach of the Nordhaus framework. These more complex accounts of the innovative process alter the basic policy conclusions of the simpler public goods analysis. Excessive protection for first generation innovation can impede later stages, thereby undermining some of the salutary effects of strong intellectual property protection." More generally, these models cast doubt on the notion that society can perfectly calibrate intellectual property rewards for each innovation. Although the Manifesto appropriately highlights the cumulative nature of software innovation, 12 its policy recommendations assume that the best legal regime is one that rewards all innovators in proportion to their value-added. The determination of the "optimal" form of protection would be extraordinarily complex in practice, however, suggesting that the fine tuning envisioned by the Manifesto is unachievable.' 3 8. Paul A. David, New Technology, Diffusion, Public Policy, and Industrial Competitiveness 20 (Center for Economic Policy Research, Pub. No. 46, 1985) In addition, the Manifesto largely overlooks a set of factors relevant to determining the need for intellectual property protection. 1 4 Even before appropriability concerns are addressed, non-market sources of revenue must be assessed. Government and private subsidies of research, especially at universities which publish and otherwise freely disseminate their discoveries, alleviate the public goods problem. Many ground-breaking areas of computer software research have been supported generously in this manner. 1 5 Turning to appropriability concerns, as the authors of the Manifesto discuss, there are numerous modes of legal protection for intellectual work beyond copyright and patent, including trade secret, trademark, and joint ventures. 16 The Manifesto is skeptical of the efficacy of these means of appropriation because software products often bear their knowhow on their face. Yet even this observation must be significantly qualified. Much of the know-how necessary to succeed in the rapidly evolving software market relates to product marketing, support, and reputation. 17 The continual upgrading of products serves to maintain market share even as clones appear. Although important aspects of software products are easily observed by potential competitors, competitors must be able to marshal multiple competencies (or be wise enough to collaborate with others who can) in order to compete successfully in software markets.
In this vein, appropriability can and does occur through contractual means in the software industry. 1 8 Clear property rights, even if they do not perfectly reward all those involved in the chain of innovation, can provide the basis for a well-functioning licensing regime. An implicit system of "private" intellectual property can arise through such contracting.
Beyond appropriability concerns, the social value generated by computer technology depends significantly on the extent to which network 14. See Menell, Legal Protection, supra Res. Pol'y 285, 288-89 (1986) (discussing "tacit" know-how and role of "complementary assets," such as marketing, manufacturing, and after-sales support, in appropriating returns to research and development).
18. In fact, one of the major concerns is excessive appropriability in the form of monopolization of product areas. The Sega and Nintendo litigation highlight this problem. externalities are realized. 19 Intellectual property protection plays a critical role in determining the size and quality of these networks. 20 Software products or attributes affecting the size of networks should, therefore, not generally receive intellectual property protection unless they require significant research efforts. 21 Thus, the Manifesto's anticloning regime, with no novelty or nonobviousness requirement, would unduly inhibit the realization of network externalities. Although the Manifesto recognizes the interoperability concern, 22 it fails to offer concrete proposals to address this problem.
In summary, legal protection for computer software should be approached within a rich economic framework emphasizing the cumulative nature of innovation; the broad range of legal and non-legal methods for appropriating revenues from innovation; network effects; and the limitations and costs of comprehensive legal rules for appropriating returns to innovation, including the costs of keeping abreast of the rights of others and the costs of avoiding infringement. 23 At various points, the Manifesto discusses some of these other factors; nonetheless, its emphasis on developing a comprehensive appropriability regime promotes a simplistic theoretical perfectionism over a more realistic targeting of salient problems. Moreover, it employs an outmoded economic framework for analyzing legal protection for intellectual work.
The Manifesto's approach to the public goods problem raised by software innovation is analogous to another theoretically appealing but practically infeasible solution to the public goods problem created by environmental externalities. According to the traditional economic model, the market system will overproduce goods creating pollution because the full social cost of these goods (resource costs plus pollution harm) is not adequately reflected in the price system. 24 The standard prescription is 19. The term "network externality" describes a class of goods for which the utility (or satisfaction) derived from the good's consumption increases with the number of other persons consuming the good. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424, 424 (1985 [Vol. 94:2644 to internalize externalities by imposing taxes on creators of externalities equal to the additional (non-priced) effects of the activities. Taking this theory to its logical extreme, every member of society should wear an externality meter and be billed regularly for the external harms that he or she causes. In the real world, however, such a policy would obviously be impossible in view of the difficulty of monitoring, the costs of administration, and the complex interactions of activities in society. Society opts, instead, for a mixed approach in which those externalities for which it is feasible (economically and politically) to charge are internalized through fees; other forms of pollution are addressed by other regulatory means and social policies (including doing nothing where regulation is infeasible). As direct internalizing approaches become feasible, for example through the advent of less expensive metering technologies, 25 they can be incorporated into the policy matrix.
The Manifesto's focus on achieving perfect appropriability is akin to outfitting innovators and product developers with externality meters. 26 Given real-world institutional constraints and the complexities of technology markets, such an approach is unrealistic. As with environmental policy, intellectual property policy must reflect economic and institutional constraints. The resulting policy will inevitably be somewhat untidy, yet that may be the best that can be achieved in a complex world.
II. TECHNOLOGY PROGNOSTICATION
A second major challenge in analyzing legal protection for new technology is in predicting the future path of the technology. The appropriate form of protection for some technological developments may hinder the progress of other innovations. Had CONTU foreseen the explosive growth of microcomputers, for example, its recommendations might have been significantly different. 2 7 It is even possible that the choice of legal regime may substantially affect which fields of technology will flourish.
By its very nature, technology prognostication is a risky business. The authors of the Manifesto, including one who has successfully pre-25. See Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An Incentive Approach to Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 Ecology L.Q. 655, 706-08 (1990).
26. See, e.g., Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2413 (suggesting that every innovator should be compensated for his or her work); id. at 2419 (suggesting that the level of royalties and degree of protection be calibrated to the "remoteness" of the copier's "market segment"). As noted earlier, see supra note 13, the Manifesto cautions that many of the alternatives present significant administrative problems. By failing to confront these problems, however, the Manifesto severely limits its usefulness to policymakers. Had the Manifesto confronted these problems, the authors would have anticipated the methodological criticism raised herein. dicted the direction of software technology (and markets) and another who is a leading researcher in artificial intelligence, are better placed than most to assess these matters. Nonetheless, the Manifesto provides few revelations about what computer technology might look like in twenty years. In fact, the Manifesto argues that the legal regime should be independent of the current state of technology. 28 Without some effort to foresee the path of technology, however, it is difficult to see how the proposals of the Manifesto will prove any less anachronistic than the CONTU deliberations or earlier attempts to address future technological change through the design of intellectual property regimes. 2 9 Based upon general trends in software innovation of the past two decades, it is possible to predict some important contours of computer technology markets in the coming two decades. Many of the major tasks for which computers hold particular promise have been recognized. Computer software now performs most word-processing, information processing, scientific calculations, record-keeping, and business analysis. It also assists in numerous other business and technical applications, such as engineering analysis, industrial design, and architectural design. Software performs numerous functions in automated control systemsranging from simple home devices such as microwave ovens to air traffic control systems. Software plays a growing role in the education and entertainment fields. Although dramatically new applications for computer software may yet be tapped, it is likely that the next generation of technological innovation in software will largely improve upon the usability of the existing applications. As hardware innovations expand computing speed and memory, we can expect to see improvements in interface design, voice recognition, multi-tasking, networking, and software integration. We can also expect to see further development of multimedia.
It is not at all clear that the anticloning legislation promoted by the Manifesto would address these directions for computer technology particularly well. Patent or patent-type legislation (with shortened duration and improved examination) should do well in handling new techniques for improving the operation of software and hardware. The major problems on the horizon appear to relate to network externalities in the contexts of interface design and interoperability (especially networking) and the more traditional copyright problems attendant to assembling compilations for multimedia works. The Manifesto's proposed anticloning legislation would likely exacerbate the former problem 30 by protecting non-novel or obvious product standards. It would do little to address the problems plaguing the multimedia market because the problems 28. See Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2407. 29. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Or. L. Rev. 275, 358-61 (1989) .
30. As noted earlier, see supra note 22 and accompanying text, the Manifesto recognizes network concerns, typically under the rubric of interoperability, yet it offers no concrete proposals to ameliorate these concerns. [Vol. 94:2644 there relate significantly to access to traditional copyright subject matter.
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III. THE POLrICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLEcTrUAL PROPERTY REFORM
Like much academic public policy scholarship, the Manifesto offers a novel, comprehensive legal regime tailored to the problems it diagnoses in the existing system. This ambitious plan would reorder much of the existing legal landscape and significantly alter economic interests. Consequently, it is essential to assess the political impediments to the proposed reforms.
Over the past decade, legal and public policy scholars have emphasized the influence interest groups wield in the legislative process. 8 2 Intellectual property reform is particularly dominated by interest group politics. Professor Jessica Litman has described in detail how the nature of the legislative process is largely to blame for the difficulties that copyright law has had in accommodating technological change. 33 In the words of one commentator intimately familiar with the legislative process:
Congress is generally not in the business of satisfying abstract concerns about "good copyright policy." Rather, Congress is an intensely political body, loath to impose one-sided losses on legitimate interest groups. Since "good copyright policy" would often require precisely such one-sided losses, copyright reforms may languish for decades before being enacted, or may simply be abandoned.
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The political economy of reforming intellectual property law to accommodate new technologies creates a particularly perplexing dilemma. From the standpoint of a political economist, the opportunity for comprehensive reform is most propitious before interest groups form around a new technology. Unfortunately, policymakers usually do not have sufficient understanding of the path of such technology and the implications for an appropriate intellectual property regime during this nascent stage of development. Policymakers thus are left in the awkward position of -Kent L. Rev. 307, 330-36 (1989 either creating a regime before they adequately understand the problem or waiting until the contours of the problem emerge, at which point economic interests have vested, and reform, if it is possible at all, is severely constrained.
The history of legal protection for computer software illustrates this dilemma well. At the time CONTU was created, there was a real political opportunity for establishing a novel, comprehensive legal regime to govem computer software. Neither patent nor copyright had yet been important in the software area. The industry had developed principally through trade secret protection. Hence the range of options was rather large. On the other hand, there was relatively little appreciation of the problems that lay ahead, in particular the possibility of impeding network externalities and the potential for misapplication of copyright protection to functionality. 3 5 The outcome of the CONTU process was not surprisingly a rather naive set of recommendations, closely approximating the status quo. 3 6 More recently, Congress passed the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 3 7 a modest protection regime crafted by the affected interests. 3 8 Thus far, sui generis regimes for software more generally, such as that proposed in the Manifesto, have generated little enthusiasm in the legislature. 3 9 In view of the substantial vesting of economic interests that has already occurred around the existing legal regime for computer software, it is difficult to imagine Congress giving serious attention to a comprehensive reform effort without a crying need. 40 After many years of confusion, the existing legal regime appears to be muddling through. In the view of most commentators, the recent Altai 4 ' and Sega 4 2 decisions have correctly resolved two of the three major problems that have plagued copyright protection for software. 43 The Lotus case, 44 which presents the scope of copyright protection for user interfaces, could potentially resolve the last major difficulty inherent in the application of copyright law to computer software. 45 Patent protection for software may prove to be problematic, although the extent of problems to date has been modest. The Manifesto's concern for underprotection has yet to find vocal support, even among the economic interests that would clearly benefit from strengthening intellectual property protection.
Any attempt at sui generis reform would face not only the private interests vested in federal copyright law, but also the inertia flowing from the hard-won battle to establish an international copyright regime for computer software. As the authors of the Manifesto recognize, the United States government devoted substantial energy over the past decade to browbeating most of the developed nations into following its path. 46 Neither the U.S. government nor the many entities desiring uniform protection for their products across national borders are eager to start a new fight.
In this political climate it would be more efficacious to address the individual problems most amenable to reform than to attempt a comprehensive, sui generis scheme. The two most important targets appear to be concerns about patent protection and impediments to the nascent field of multimedia software products.
Whether patent protection will prove to be a serious problem for the software industry is a matter of controversy. 47 Some of the concerns that have been raised, such as inconsistency in the examination process and the lack of a comprehensive repository of prior art, can and are being addressed without legislative changes. 48 Nonetheless, other aspects of the patent system, such as the long term of protection and the lack of compulsory licensing, pose serious potential problems. Congress may be politically unable to address these problems once powerful economic interests vest in strong patent portfolios. Hence it would be opportune for Congress to take up this matter in the very near future, especially in light of the race among software firms to build patent portfolios.
Similarly, Congress may have a window of opportunity for addressing the legal issues posed by the emerging multimedia field. The basic problem-developing an efficient and equitable means for obtaining rights to use copyrighted works-is not new. Yet multimedia technology offers powerful methods for combining vast amounts of material in useful ways. Under existing copyright law, developers must either negotiate express licenses for each work used or make such limited use as to come within the fair use defense. New institutions that facilitate obtaining permission have started to develop. 49 Nonetheless, this is a propitious time for the legislature to consider alternative regimes-such as limited compulsory licensing-to spur this technology, particularly in the educational sector.
Recognition of the political dimensions of intellectual property reform should not be interpreted as an excuse for despair. The Manifesto must be commended for its explication of the technology and the appropriability problems that exist, comprehensive diagnosis of problems with the existing system, delineation of an ambitious comprehensive regime, and analysis of alternatives. This work, however, should be more fully integrated with an analysis of the institutional realities so as to put forth a pragmatic agenda for reform. Timing is a critical element in the passage of any legislation, especially with respect to a rapidly changing area like software protection. The opportunity for comprehensive reform of legal protection for computer software, such as that outlined by the Manifesto, may have passed, at least for the present. Nonetheless, the time may still be ripe for some of the problems highlighted by the Manifesto and others-including software patents, compatibility concerns, and copyright permissions for multimedia works-to be effectively addressed by the legislature. 49 . Cf. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2655 , 2661 -64 (1994 (arguing that high transaction costs encourage producers and users of vested intellectual property rights to develop institutions that economize on the cost of exchange).
